Conservative Historian
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Conservative Historian
Forging A National Identity: From the States to America
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We look at the forces including the Civil War, Industry, Labor and Gov Reform that changed the country from a collection of states to the United States of America.
Forging a Nation: Moving from States to America
September 2026
“We are not a nation, but a union, a confederacy of equal and sovereign states.”
John C Calhoun
“We have a great, popular, constitutional government, guarded by law and by judicature, and defended by the affections of the whole people. No monarchical throne presses these States together, no iron chain of military power encircles them; they live and stand under a government popular in its form, representative in its character, founded upon principles of equality, and so constructed, we hope, as to last forever.”
Daniel Webster
“The Union is my country. I know no South, no North, no East, no West to which I owe my allegiance”
Henry Clay
“The State of South Carolina has resumed her position among the nations of the world, as a separate and independent State; with full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent States may of right do.”
South Carolina Declaration of Secession
I have lived in Illinois for 30 years, where the most important events of my life have occurred. I met and married my wife in the Land of Lincoln. Raised two kids and got my first jobs in sales, then in marketing. I started as a callow 24-year-old and left as a grizzled fifty-something. Yet when people ask where I am from, even my wife, born in Illinois, will note that I am a “cheesehead,” a son of Wisconsin. To this day I root for the Packers a lot and the Bucks a little. The Bears, Bulls or Cubs? Who? Ok, of course I know the Bears but only in the “them” category.
But these designations are fundamentally cosmetic. If I was traveling in London or Rome and asked where I am from, I would not say Illinois or Wisconsin; I would say the United States. Yet it has not always been this clear that one’s nation would usually trump one’s state.
Historians often interchangeably talk of the founding of our national identity and the founding of the nation. The latter happened during the Revolutionary War and the years that immediately followed. But to parse the name of the country, it was more States than United in the period up to the Civil War. Not just identities but customs, culture, livelihoods, even some languages were based on localities and states, not on a country. That changed with the Civil War and the roughly 25 years after it. By 1890 there were still regional designations, the North and East, the West, and the South, but the era of referring to a state as one’s country, as Robert E. Lee famously did in renouncing his officer’s oath and joining the Confederate cause, was passing into history.
Whereas John C. Calhoun would have put South Carolina before America, or even James Buchanan, a Pennsylvanian, by the time of Teddy Roosevelt his New York roots were less important than his identity as an American.
This process of conversion from local and state identities to a national one contained many elements, including the Civil War, increased use of executive power, industrialization, labor movements emanating from industry, and public policies seen as advancing national interests rather than sectarian ones, such as bimetallism and tariffs. We will touch on many of these and also move from a 100,000-foot level to one closer to the ground to see one federal government change wrought by nationalization: Civil Service Reform.
There is a continuing debate among Civil War historians about the origins of that great and hideous conflict. One argument is that the conflagration was a states’ rights issue. The other, more commonly accepted belief is that the war was about slavery. The first always feels more like an excuse than an argument. Certainly, there are no words in the Constitution that clearly state a state could not leave. The counter is that the word Union conveys volumes, and additionally there is no provision that a state could leave. Yet in the very same Declaration of Secession, the delegates at the convention of South Carolina could not help but give the game away. The declaration of South Carolina mentions slaves no less than five times, including this passage, “The right of property in slaves was recognized by giving to free persons distinct political rights, by giving them the right to represent, and burthening them with direct taxes for three-fifths of their slaves; by authorizing the importation of slaves for twenty years; and by stipulating for the rendition of fugitives from labor.” Tariffs? Not mentioned? Taxes, that bane of the Revolutionaries? Only mentioned in context to slavery. All of the other issues of the day were seen as something upon which a compromise could be reached, but after several attempts in 1820 and 1850, there was no agreement on slavery; thus, the cause of the war.
Yet it was from this crucible that the vision of Clay and Webster would come to fruition, the ebb of looking at states and localities as the locus of governmental identity in favor of the federal government. This process, along with the end of slavery, began in the crucible of the Civil War.
For the North to more quickly embrace national identity was a logical evolution considering the forces at play. Yet in 1858, Jefferson Davis, Senator from the state of Mississippi, made a case not necessarily based on the needs of MS, but rather a regional argument.
“I say to you here as I have said to the Democracy of New York, if it should ever come to pass that the Constitution shall be perverted to the destruction of our rights so that we shall have the mere right as a feeble minority unprotected by the barrier of the Constitution to give an ineffectual negative vote in the Halls of Congress, we shall then bear to the federal government the relation our colonial fathers did to the British crown, and if we are worthy of our lineage we will in that event redeem our rights even if it be through the process of revolution…”
This was not a states’ rights argument but rather a nationalist argument for Davis, asking protection for “a feeble minority…”
The American Civil War reshaped the nation’s long-term economic trajectory by accelerating structural transformations that laid the foundation for modern industrial capitalism. The conflict forced the Federal government to expand its fiscal capacity through new taxes, national banking legislation, and an unprecedented issuance of public debt—measures that established a more centralized and stable financial system. Wartime demand stimulated manufacturing, transportation, and technological innovation, particularly in the North, where industrial output surged, and railroad networks expanded dramatically. These developments helped shift the United States from a predominantly agrarian economy to an increasingly diversified and industrial one. Meanwhile, the destruction of slavery dismantled the South’s labor system, initiating a protracted and uneven transition toward wage labor, sharecropping, and limited industrialization. In the decades after Appomattox, these combined changes positioned the United States for rapid economic growth, national integration, and eventual emergence as a global industrial and financial power.
Nearly every sector of the Union economy witnessed increased production. Mechanization of farming allowed a single farmer growing crops such as corn or wheat to plant, harvest, and process much more than was possible when hand and animal power were the only available tools. (By 1860, a threshing machine could thresh 12 times as much grain per hour as could six men.) This mechanization became even more important as many farmers left home to enlist in the Union military. Those remaining behind could continue to manage the farm using labor-saving devices such as reapers and horse-drawn planters.
Northern transportation industries boomed during the conflict as well--particularly railroads. The North’s larger number of tracks and better ability to construct and move parts gave it a distinct advantage over the South. Union forces moving south or west to fight often rode to battle on trains traveling on freshly laid tracks. In fact, as Northern forces traveled further south to fight and occupy the Confederacy, the War Department created the United States Military Railroads, designed to build rails to carry troops and supplies as well as operate captured Southern rail lines and equipment. By war’s end, it was the world’s largest railroad system.
The war also pushed the U.S. government to take unprecedented steps. Congress raised tariffs and passed the first national income tax in 1862. In late 1861, Congress created the nation’s first fiat currency, called greenbacks. At first, the expansion of the currency and the rapid rise in government spending created an uptick in business in 1862–1863. As the war dragged on, inflation also hit the North. Workers demanded higher wages to pay rents and buy necessities, while the business community groaned under their growing tax burden. The United States, however, never pursued a policy of impressment of food and supplies. The factories and farms of the North successfully supplied Union troops, while the federal government, with some adjustments, found a way to pay for the war. None of this is to suggest that the North’s superior ability to supply its war machine made the outcome of the war inevitable. Any account of the war must consider the tangled web of politics, battles, and economics that occurred between 1861 and 1865.
There is a scenario in which, if Lee had won at Gettysburg, things could have been different. Imagine the historical what-if that on the 2nd day, the Confederates overran Little Round Top, turning the flank of the Union army, and sending the entire force fleeing in Pennsylvania. A war-weary North, thinking Lee unbeatable, might have sued for peace. But Gettysburg was a big loss for the South, and within days Grant would take Vicksburg, initiating big victories East and West and providing the North with a hero to counter Lee.
Just one example of the shift from state to national comes from the organization of the opposing forces. At the beginning of the conflict, armies were organized essentially by state, and not just at the regimental level. At Gettysburg, in Longstreet’s First Corps existed John Bell Hood’s Texas division and George Pickett’s Virginians. But not all of the units were so cohesive. Heth’s division, part of Ambrose Powell Hill’s 3rd Corps, first in action on the first day at Gettysburg, comprised Virginians, of which Heth himself belonged, but a brigade of North Carolinians and Brig. Gen. James J. Archer’s unit, a mix of Tennesseans and Alabamians. Through the cauldron of war, these state designations would lose much of their cohesion. In 1861, Virginians existed; by the end, they were Confederate soldiers. One example in the Western Theater, during the final campaigns of the Army of Tennessee, was the fusion of multiple shrunken infantry regiments from states like Alabama and Tennessee into units like the 4th Consolidated Tennessee Infantry or mixed field groupings.
On the Northern side, it was even less state-centric, with only the regiments maintaining local identity. To use another Gettysburg example, the 3rd Brigade, First Division, V Corps, commanded by Colonel Strong Vincent, had four regiments each from a different state. (83rd Pennsylvania, 16th Michigan, 44th New York, and one of the most famous in American history, the 20th Maine, commanded by native son Joshua Chamberlain). As the war progressed, state concepts deteriorated in the face of the massive regional identities.
Even before the Civil War, transportation improvements, including the construction of canals (notably the Erie Canal), steamboats, and later, railroads, facilitated the movement of raw materials and finished goods, linking previously isolated markets and encouraging regional specialization. The telegraph, developed by Samuel Morse, revolutionized communication and allowed for more coordinated business operations over vast distances.
But one of the Civil War’s outliers was the build-out of railroads. Railroads played a central role in industrialization, both as consumers of steel and coal and as enablers of national markets. The completion of the Transcontinental Railroad in 1869 symbolized the conquest of space and the unification of the continental U.S. into a single economic entity. This network of rails transformed the movement of goods and people and helped integrate the national economy.
In 1840, traveling from New York to San Francisco took roughly 4 to 9 months (120 to 270 days), depending entirely on whether you chose to go by sea or by land, as transcontinental railroads and regular steamship lines via Panama did not yet exist. Traveling from New York to San Francisco took about 7 to 10 days by train after the completion of the First Transcontinental Railroad. Alternative maritime routes, such as sailing around South America or taking a steamship via Panama, took 30 to 40 days or several months.
But the aftermath of the war left portions of the Confederacy in ruins. State governments were mired in debt. White planters had most of their capital tied up in enslaved laborers, and so lost most of their wealth. Cotton remained the most significant crop, but the war changed how it was grown and sold. Planters broke up large farms into smaller plots tended by single families in exchange for a portion of the crop, a system called sharecropping. Once cotton production resumed, Americans found that their cotton now competed with new cotton plantations around the world. For the South as a whole, the war and Reconstruction marked the start of a period of deep poverty that would last until at least the New Deal of the 1930s.
Yet even the level of misery spurred nationalization in the South. Founded in 1865, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) extended into almost every southern state by 1870 and became a vehicle for white southern resistance to the Republican Party’s Reconstruction-era policies aimed at establishing political and economic equality for Black Americans. Its members waged an underground campaign of intimidation and violence directed at white and Black Republican leaders. Though Congress passed legislation designed to curb Klan terrorism, the organization saw its primary goal—the reestablishment of white supremacy—fulfilled through Democratic victories in state legislatures across the South in the 1870s. Though there were local branches, the loose organization featured a Grand Wizard and a Grand Cyclops who were not strictly based on states. There were certainly variations of the Klan in different localities, but there was not a simple white supremacist movement strictly based on states. So even in the South, the differences of South Carolina and Alabama were beginning to blur.
Sadly, the impetus of a true national identity was lost with Lincoln’s assassination and the advent of Andrew Johnson as president. Once President Johnson reverted to his Southern roots, showing sympathies for the Southern states that ran against the desired policies of the reigning government in Congress, the Radical Republicans. As Frederick Douglas noted, Johnson was “No friend of our race.”
So what came out of the Civil War was a common national identity abrogating the previous state one, but often with a veil of regionalism roughly divided into the East that really meant New England to Maryland and New York to Illinois, the old South, and the West, everything to the west of the Mississippi River but North of Texas.
Another nationalist trend was the exploration of greater executive power. Though there were national leaders from Washington to Jackson to Lincoln for the nation to embrace or castigate, the line was uneven and would eventually end with Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, the first presidents who truly dominated national politics. Before them, we had the likes of Rutherford Hayes and Chester Arthur. Yet many presidents after the Civil War exercised new powers that created a national stamp.
In order to preserve Post Bellum peace, Grant availed himself of several new powers. But something in the 40 years between Jackson and Grant had occurred in the American psyche. Jackson was a Tennessean, a Southerner, and an American, in that order. Though postbellum figures still identified strongly with their state and region, the line between these identities and American identity began to blur.
One of the first examples of looking at an issue in terms of the Nation, rather than the state or locality, occurred in 1873. Just four months into Rutherford B. Hayes’ presidency, the nation faced a nationwide labor strike for the first time. In response to the depression wrought by the panic of 1873, railroads cut workers’ pay and sparked a strike that hit most major cities. After another pay cut, another and even larger, and better organized strike in 1877. The strike began when Baltimore & Ohio (B&O) Railroad president John W. Garrett cut wages by ten percent to increase dividends by the same percentage. By July 14, 1877, it had spread to the Martinsburg, West Virginia station where strikers refused to let freight trains pass.
Due to violence against workers who refused to take part in the strike, and because the police proved ineffective in stopping it, West Virginia Governor Henry M. Matthews sent in militia forces to move the trains. This resulted in one militiaman who was shot by a striker while trying to operate a switch; the militiaman returned fire. Both were wounded, and the striker died. In the end, the militia failed to get the trains moving again, as strikebreakers were unwilling to operate them. Matthews then requested federal troops. Hayes reluctantly agreed to send them. The B&O billed the federal government for transporting the troops into Martinsburg, and the strike moved on to Baltimore and then to Pittsburgh.
As historian Ron Cherney notes, “Hayes was not the first president to use federal forces to maintain order during a strike, but he usually receives credit for a precedent that was to be repeated as the nation adjusted to its new and sometimes uncomfortable role as an industrial society.”
But not even a mind so supple and incisive as Madison could have predicted the conversion of America from agricultural to industrial. In 1800, approximately 83% of the American labor force was engaged in agriculture, meaning the vast majority of the population lived and worked on farms. In 1894, approximately one-third of Americans worked in agriculture. This represents a significant decline from the mid-19th century when over 50% of the workforce was employed in farming. Though no records of industrial workers were kept in 1800, the number was probably less than 200,000. By 1894, that figure would include 4.4 million Americans.
And in turn, the response to industry created workers’ unions. The harsh conditions of many workers in these industries led to the rise of labor movements and the formation of unions such as the Knights of Labor and the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Adding to the Great Railroad Strike of 1877Forag, other nationalized strikes and labor disputes, including the Haymarket Affair of 1886 and the Homestead Strike of 1892, reflected deep tensions between labor and capital.
The Knights of Labor, the first national industrial Union in the United States, was founded in Philadelphia on December 9, 1869, by Uriah Stephens (1821-82) and eight other Philadelphia garment cutters. Intended to overcome the limitations of craft unions, the organization was designed to include all those who toiled with their hands. By mid-1886, nearly one million laborers called themselves Knights, making the organization the largest and most influential labor union in nineteenth-century America. Larger than any guild and containing several different professions, a laborer in Pennsylvania would consider greater ties with a fellow Knight in IL, rather than with other Pennsylvanians.
Though the Knights declined after 1886, due in part to internal discord in the aftermath of the disastrous violence that erupted during a labor protest in Haymarket Square in Chicago; strong opposition from capital; and competition from the trades unions of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), they still represented a national labor group. And national in a character never seen before. It was the only nineteenth-century labor organization to organize African Americans, women, and unskilled workers on an equal basis with white artisans. All of this might also explain part of its decline. Many were not ready for this type of integration and would not be for another 80 years.
Trade unions of these sizes and scopes were essentially non-existent before 1870 and furthered the change in the identity. One might have been from Buffalo and another from New York City, yet still feel kinship. But a person belonging to a union would feel far stronger ties to another union man than to someone from a similar geographic area.
The National Identity of the Federal Government
Alongside these issues came Civil Service Reform. The patronage, or spoils system, would logically accrue to those in proximity to those dolling out the jobs. The limitations imposed by a professional class of bureaucrats would naturally break down local loyalties by limiting the largesse. In the early years of the United States, the federal government was relatively small, and civil service positions were limited. Presidents such as George Washington and John Adams appointed officials largely based on personal reputation, competence, and political reliability. Because the federal government’s administrative responsibilities were modest, there was little pressure to create a formalized bureaucratic structure.
During the administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, the principle that public office should be filled by qualified individuals remained broadly accepted. While political considerations played a role, widespread patronage had not yet become the dominant mechanism for staffing government offices. Federal employment was generally stable, and turnover was limited.
This early system, however, was based largely on informal norms rather than institutional safeguards. As American democracy expanded and political competition intensified in the early nineteenth century, these norms began to erode. The growth of political parties and electoral mobilization created new incentives for distributing government jobs as rewards for political loyalty.
The transformation of federal employment practices began during the presidency of Andrew Jackson. Jackson and his supporters argued that frequent rotation in office would prevent corruption and ensure that government remained accountable to the people. In practice, this philosophy evolved into what became known as the “spoils system,” summarized by the phrase “to the victor belong the spoils.”
Under the spoils system, political parties rewarded supporters with government jobs after electoral victories. Thousands of federal positions—particularly in the postal service and customs offices—were distributed to loyal party members. Patronage became a central mechanism of party organization. Local political machines relied on federal jobs to maintain loyalty, mobilize voters, and fund political activities.
Although Jackson justified the policy as democratic reform, critics argued that it undermined administrative competence and encouraged corruption. Because many appointees lacked experience or qualifications, government efficiency often suffered. Furthermore, officeholders were frequently replaced after elections, resulting in instability within federal agencies.
Despite these criticisms, the spoils system persisted for decades. Presidents from both major parties—including Abraham Lincoln, Ulysses S. Grant, and Rutherford B. Hayes—were pressured by party leaders and congressional allies to distribute federal jobs to supporters. Patronage became deeply embedded in American political culture, making reform difficult. By the mid-nineteenth century, dissatisfaction with the spoils system was growing. Several factors contributed to the rise in support for reform.
First, the federal government was expanding rapidly. Industrialization, westward expansion, and the aftermath of the Civil War significantly increased administrative responsibilities. As federal agencies grew more complex, the need for trained and experienced administrators became more apparent.
Second, numerous scandals revealed the vulnerabilities of patronage-based administration, especially as the size and scope of the federal government continued its inexorable expansion. The administration of Ulysses S. Grant was particularly associated with corruption scandals involving federal officials, including the Whiskey Ring and other abuses of public office. Although Grant himself was not personally implicated in most scandals, the controversies damaged public confidence in the federal government and highlighted the dangers of patronage politics.
Third, a new class of middle-class reformers began advocating for professional government administration. Influenced by developments in Britain, where merit-based civil service reforms had already been implemented, American reformers called for competitive examinations and protections against political interference. Organizations such as the National Civil Service Reform League played a major role in promoting these ideas.
The event that finally galvanized national support for reform was the assassination of President James A. Garfield in 1881. Garfield was shot by Charles J. Guiteau, a disgruntled office seeker who believed he deserved a federal appointment for his supposed support of the Republican Party.
“The entire nation weeps at the tragic death of the great and good Garfield. May God take his soul into rest and take care of his afflicted family is my heartfelt prayer, and peace be unto his ashes.” These are the words of John A. Frenger, who, astonishingly, was not from Ohio or even the North, but a farmer from Virginia.
Guiteau’s actions shocked the nation and exposed the extreme pressures created by the patronage system. Thousands of job seekers routinely inundated presidents and members of Congress with requests for appointments. The tragedy highlighted the dangers of tying political expectations so closely to government employment.
Public outrage following Garfield’s death created momentum for reform that had previously been lacking. Political leaders recognized that the existing system was both inefficient and potentially dangerous.
In 1883, Congress passed the landmark Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act, which fundamentally altered the structure of federal employment.
The law established the United States Civil Service Commission to oversee federal hiring practices. It introduced competitive examinations for certain government positions and prohibited the firing or demotion of employees for political reasons. Additionally, the act made it illegal to require federal workers to contribute to political campaigns.
Initially, the Pendleton Act applied to only about ten percent of federal jobs. However, it contained an important provision allowing the president to expand the merit system to additional positions. Over time, successive administrations used this authority to gradually increase the number of positions covered by civil service protections.
The act represented a compromise between reformers and political leaders. It did not eliminate patronage entirely, but it established the institutional framework for a professional bureaucracy. What was less noted about this reform is how it changed state-based appointments.
In his 2nd inauguration, delivered in 1833, Jackson attempted to note that “In proportion, therefore, as the general government encroaches upon the rights of the states, in the same proportion does it impair its own power and detract from its ability to fulfill the purposes of its creation. Solemnly impressed with these considerations, my countrymen will ever find me ready to exercise my constitutional powers in arresting measures which may directly or indirectly encroach upon the rights of the states or tend to consolidate all political power in the general government.”
He did go on to strike a balance, however. “But of equal, and, indeed, of incalculable, importance is the Union of these states, and the sacred duty of all to contribute to its preservation by a liberal support of the general government in the exercise of its just powers.
By the time of William McKinley’s 1st inauguration, a speech that ran to 4,000 words, the only time the term “states” arises is in the context of the United States, the nation, not the individual entities. Here is the opener, “Our faith teaches that there is no safer reliance than upon the God of our fathers, who has so singularly favored the American people in every national trial, and who will not forsake us so long as we obey His commandments and walk humbly in His footsteps.”
American and National were now the words, and the mindset built from many states into one country.