Revisiting the Monroe Doctrine

In the light of the capture of Nicholas Maduro, we explore the original intention of the Monroe Doctrine, what it later became, and what such a doctrine means for America today.  

Transcript

Revisiting the Monroe Doctrine

January 2026

In the Western Hemisphere, the United States’ adherence to the Monroe Doctrine may, however reluctantly, force it, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to exercise an international police power.

Theodore Roosevelt

The fact that Brazil and Chile now have China as their largest trading partner means the Monroe Doctrine is certainly something of the past.

Dambisa Moyo

Of all the Founders, I have always thought of James Monroe, the last of the Founding Fathers presidents, and the last of the Virginia Dynasty, as the luckiest.  Washington was the father of the nation.  Adams was omnipresent at every step of our nation’s history, from the Revolution to the presidency to elder statesmanship.  Jefferson authored the Declaration of Independence (well co-authored with Adams and Franklin).  Madison was the architect of the Constitution.  And Monroe was, well, Monroe. In his first election, the dumpster fire that was the Federalist Party, represented by Rufus King, lost so badly, 68% to 17% popular vote and 16 states to 3, that four years later, no one bothered to run against him.  He is the only guy, aside from Washington, to run unopposed, as he did in 1820.  The 1800 election between Jefferson and Adams was marked by such acrimony that the nation barely avoided a President Aaron Burr.  Madison barely won reelection in 1812.  Yet Monroe sailed through both times to the point where the era was labeled the Era of Good Feelings.  

Not even the first financial catastrophe to involve the nation could topple Monroe. In 1819, a financial panic swept across the country. The trade growth that followed the War of 1812 came to an abrupt halt. Unemployment mounted, banks failed, mortgages were foreclosed, and agricultural prices fell by half. Investment in Western lands collapsed.  Yet it did not affect Monroe, as future panics cost Van Buren and Hoover their 2nd terms.  Monroe was a signer of the 1820 Missouri Compromise, but the true architects were Henry Clay and Jesse Thompson. 

And in terms of foreign policy, we have the Jay Treaty, the Louisiana Purchase, and the Peace of Ghent.  But none of them bear the name of the president at the time.  But there is a Monroe Doctrine, even though, as we shall see, it probably should have been named the Adams Doctrine, but I am getting ahead of myself.  

For this podcast, we will answer a few historical questions.  How did the Monroe Doctrine come about?  Who were the architects of the Doctrine?  What were the intentions at the time of its issuance?  And what are the implications of the Doctrine today, given that several pundits now refer to a “Donroe Doctrine” named for Donald Trump?  

The Monroe Doctrine stands as one of the most consequential declarations in the history of United States foreign policy. First articulated in President James Monroe’s annual message to Congress on December 2, 1823, the Doctrine asserted a new strategic vision for the Western Hemisphere, rejecting European colonial expansion and interference in the Americas. 

And there we immediately come to the crux of the document and to one of its most significant misunderstandings.

It was initially a modest and largely symbolic statement, and only over time did the Monroe Doctrine evolve into a central pillar of American diplomacy and hemispheric dominance. Its transformation from a defensive warning to European imperialists into a justification for US intervention reveals much about the nation’s changing power, ambitions, and conception of its global role.

The Monroe Doctrine emerged from a unique convergence of international and domestic circumstances in the early nineteenth century. In the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, Europe was in a period of political realignment. Conservative monarchies, particularly those associated with the Holy Alliance—Russia, Austria, and Prussia—sought to suppress revolutionary movements and, where possible, restore colonial control. All three nations had been directly exposed, by Napoleon’s initial successes, to the French Revolution; long-time dynasties ruled all, and unlike Great Britain, had no representative mechanism to siphon off the furies of populist yearnings.  The precipitating crisis for the making of the Doctrine was a 1821 declaration by the Russians that they would prohibit foreign shipping within 115 miles of their holdings on the Pacific coast. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams rebuffed the edict in terms anticipating the Doctrine.

At the same time, much of Latin America had recently won independence from Spain and Portugal through prolonged revolutionary struggles. These newly independent states were politically fragile and militarily vulnerable, raising fears that European powers might attempt to recolonize them.

The United States, itself a relatively young republic, viewed these developments with concern. American leaders sympathized ideologically with the independence movements, seeing them as extensions of republican principles akin to those of the American Revolution. Strategically, the reassertion of European colonial authority in the Western Hemisphere threatened US security and economic interests. Although the United States lacked the military strength to enforce a hemispheric policy independently, it benefited from Great Britain’s naval supremacy, which opposed renewed Spanish colonialism for commercial reasons.

Against this backdrop, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams played a decisive role in shaping the Monroe Doctrine. Again, lucky Monroe because the intellectual heft behind the concept was Adams.  He rejected a joint declaration with Britain, arguing that the United States should assert its principles independently rather than appear subordinate to a European power. The fact that an issue with Britain, ruler of the seas, was even contemplated showed that the Doctrine was, in many ways, more about Europe than the Western Hemisphere.  And note that Britain had Canada, a region the US unsuccessfully invaded in the War of 1812.  

It was Adams’ influence that ensured that Monroe’s message articulated a distinct American position grounded in sovereignty, non-colonization, and non-intervention.

The Doctrine states, “The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.”

Further:

“We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintain it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.” 

The Monroe Doctrine rested on three central principles. First, it declared that the Western Hemisphere was no longer open to European colonization. Any attempt by European powers to extend their political systems into the Americas would be regarded as a threat to US peace and safety. Second, it asserted a policy of non-intervention, under which the United States would not interfere in the internal affairs of the existing colonies of European nations. Third, it emphasized a separation of spheres, distinguishing the political systems of the New World from those of the Old World.

Importantly, the Doctrine did not constitute a formal treaty or binding international agreement. It was a unilateral policy statement embedded in a presidential address. At the time of its issuance, it carried limited immediate practical effect, as the United States lacked the military capacity to enforce it without British support.  Metternich, the Austrian statesman, took great umbrage. He called it an “act of revolt,” and pronounced it “fully as audacious” and “no less dangerous” than the American Revolution. Tsar Alexander I of Russia, possessor of an American colony, said that “it merits only the most profound contempt.” But Russia backed off its 1821 power play.

The state of the US Navy at this time, and a tiny peacetime army, meant that if, say, France sent an invasion force to Latin America, there was little the US could do – unless Britain, with its near invulnerable navy, joined in.  I use France here intentionally because just four decades later, the French did install a puppet as ruler over Mexico.  Because the year was 1864 and the US was in year three of the Civil War, there was little to be done to enforce the Doctrine.  But I digress.  

For all of its relative toothlessness, the Doctrine nevertheless represented a bold ideological claim that reshaped diplomatic norms in the hemisphere.  The upstart Republic, 36 years old, was telling European powers, centuries old, that the Americas were now hands-off.  

In its early decades, the Monroe Doctrine was more aspirational than operational. European powers largely ignored it, not out of respect for American authority but because British naval dominance made recolonization impractical. Within the United States, the Doctrine was not consistently invoked and did not immediately dominate foreign policy discourse.

However, its symbolic importance steadily grew. By asserting a special American interest in the Western Hemisphere, the Doctrine contributed to a sense of national destiny and exceptionalism. It reinforced the idea that the United States had a unique role to play in protecting republicanism in the Americas, even if it lacked the means to act decisively.

As American power expanded in the nineteenth century, so too did interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine. The era of Manifest Destiny, westward expansion, and the Mexican-American War reflected a growing confidence in US authority and the ability to handle possible foreign expansion back into the Americas. The Doctrine increasingly served as a diplomatic tool to discourage European involvement in hemispheric disputes, including boundary conflicts and debt-collection efforts.

By the late nineteenth century, the United States had emerged as the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere. At the end of the Civil War, the Union had built an army of a million men. Chester Arthur, president from 1881 – 1884, championed the modernization of the US Navy, earning him the title “Father of the Steel Navy” for pushing the construction of steam-powered steel warships, leading to the “ABC” cruisers (Atlanta, Boston, Chicago) and establishing the Naval War College and Office of Naval Intelligence. No longer did the US rely on Britain to patrol the seas around the Western Hemisphere.

This shift culminated in the Spanish-American War of 1898, which resulted in the United States acquiring overseas territories and signaling its arrival as a global imperial power. Although the war itself was not justified directly by the Monroe Doctrine, the broader logic of hemispheric protection and European exclusion underpinned American actions.

The most significant transformation of the Monroe Doctrine occurred under President Theodore Roosevelt in the early twentieth century. In response to European threats to intervene in Latin America over unpaid debts, Roosevelt articulated what became known as the Roosevelt Corollary in 1904. This reinterpretation asserted that chronic wrongdoing or financial instability in Latin American nations justified US intervention as an “international police power.”

The Roosevelt Corollary fundamentally altered the Doctrine’s character. What had begun as a shield against European interference became a rationale for American intervention in the internal affairs of neighboring states. This policy led to frequent US involvement in the Caribbean and Central America, including military occupations, regime changes, and economic oversight. Most notably, especially from Roosevelt’s perspective was simply taking Panama from the nation of Colombia.  While American leaders viewed these actions as stabilizing and protective, many Latin Americans perceived them as imperialistic and coercive.

Throughout the twentieth century, the Monroe Doctrine remained a flexible and frequently invoked concept. During the Cold War, it was used to justify US opposition to Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere, most notably during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. In that instance, the Doctrine’s original emphasis on excluding external powers aligned closely with American strategic objectives.

At the same time, the Doctrine faced increasing criticism. Latin American nations argued that it perpetuated inequality and undermined sovereignty, while critics within the United States questioned its compatibility with principles of self-determination and non-intervention. Efforts such as Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy sought to soften the Doctrine’s interventionist legacy by emphasizing cooperation and mutual respect.

The Monroe Doctrine’s enduring significance lies less in its original wording than in its adaptability. Over nearly two centuries, it evolved in response to changing power dynamics, economic interests, and ideological struggles. It helped define the Western Hemisphere as a distinct geopolitical space and asserted the United States’ claim to regional leadership.

Though sometimes compared to the combative Andrew Jackson, Donald Trump’s intervention in Venezuelan Affairs in the kidnapping, to use Trump’s own words, of President Nicholas Maduro, is pure Teddy Roosevelt in this evolution of the Monroe Doctrine.  Hence, “Donroe,” but I am not certain whether commentators use that to show a new Trump corollary or in a mocking form. 

Rich Lowry, Editor of National Review, approves, “President Trump likes putting his name on things, so maybe it was inevitable he’d get his own corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Truth be told, what the president’s just-released national security strategy sets out as a new proposition is really a restatement of the Lodge Corollary, named after Senator Henry Cabot Lodge in 1912. That proviso prohibited any foreign power or interest — not just European governments — from gaining “practical power of control” in the Western Hemisphere.  Since the 1990s, though, we’ve let down our guard. China is now Latin America’s second-largest trading partner, after the United States, and has expanded its influence in the region on all fronts. Russia has relationships with Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, and has increased its covert operations in Mexico. Hezbollah has a notable presence in Latin America.”

So is Trump moving to a sphere-of-influence concept, backed by the Doctrine, in which the US dominates the Western Hemisphere, Russia, Europe, and China, Asia Pac?  Daniel R. DePetris disagrees, “Putting this theory into practice would translate into Trump ordering a massive U.S. military drawdown from both regions, deprioritizing trade relationships there, and essentially giving Washington’s two strategic competitors carte blanche without much or any U.S. resistance.”  As DePetris notes, the US has 80,000 troops in Europe, is still the leader of NATO, has bases all through the Pacific, and just approved an $11 billion weapons package to Taiwan, which is most certainly on Beijing’s wish list for conquest.  

I think the bigger argument is what Trump’s intervention in Venezuela, combined with this past summer’s bombing of Iran, means to the concept of the America First principles espoused by many of his followers, including Vice President JD Vance.  

For me this is the break with Roosevelt’s extension of the doctrine.  Keep in mind that Trump is very much a creature of the 1980s.  In an era in which the US can produce vast swathes of oil, natural gas is now a thing, and China tries to pull ahead in new energies, Trump is imaginging those long lines outside of gas stations due to OPEC oil embargoes. He has said W Bush erred by not taking more Iraqi oil in the 2000s and he want the Venezuelan oil today.  Rather it is not a Donroe doctrine but a expedient to get what he wants that just so happens to land in this hemisphere.  Ask the mullahs of Iran how limited is Trump’s scope.  

Yet the doctrine exists and even today itself illustrates the tension between stated principles and practical outcomes in American foreign policy. 

But we, of course, are not just a 36-year-old Republic struggling for respect, but in many ways, for survival.  Today, we are still the lone true global superpower.  We have been the number 1 economy since the 1860s and the number military for the past 80 years.  The real question is not hemispheric but global.  The Monroe Doctrine started as a warning to other powers to leave the Western Hemisphere be, but morphed into turning us into the hemisphere’s cop.  We were never the global cop of American firsters’ fever dreams.  We have never truly served that role.  Wars ranging from central Africa to Iran, Iraq, and even ones in the Americas (Peru vs Ecuador) elicited no direct response in aid or military support from the US.  Yet our ability to intervene has been and continues to be profound.  The ability to project power into the city of Caracas to the point where we could abduct a head of state and his wife, without losing a single American life, is nothing short of incredible.  There is not a single government in the region that could not be militarily beaten.   

But that is not the question.  We have massive deficits and debt servicing an enormous entitlement program of retirement and healthcare.  This limits our ability to fund a military capable of any long, sustained engagements – or even too many short ones.   So the concept of the Monroe Doctrine might sound appealing to some segments, but until we address our domestic issues, the long-term ability to maintain the Doctrine, or any overseas projection of power, is in question.